so it might be useful to travel to the other extreme of behaviour to meet with fast, stressful, consequential behaviours that really test the limits of the applicability of cognitive neuroscience. At that extreme, we will find sporting performance.
If asked to give examples of tasks that require intelligence, the list will usually include maths, chess, writing, art, creativity, medicine, science, music, etc. -all things we associate with nice, middle class, intellectual or school-based performance. It is highly unlikely that sport will appear on the list. However, if one considers the challenges that elite sport performance presents to the brain, it is difficult to think of any human activity that places more demands on the brain (with the possible exception of combat soldier).
The apprenticeship of an elite athlete can be 2-2.5 decades (longer than a doctor, academic or lawyer), placing demands on the neurological machinery for self control, skill learning, long-term planning and resilience to failure, judgment, defeat and injury. The memory demands in acquiring elite level skills are considerable (for example, a slalom canoeist will have a prospective memory for up to 75 events over a minute or so) and the demands of performing at the very highest level at a specific point in time are matched, again, perhaps only by the demands of a combat soldier. In addition, the consequences of sporting failure are immediatefeedback from team mates, coaches, supporters, media, sponsors and governing bodies is swift and often uncompromising. If you are not yet convinced, the career of an athlete, unlike that of any career other than that of a soldier, is waning at 30 and almost certainly over by 35 -just about when other professionals are getting into their stride (and scientists are still winning early
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The goal of cognitive neuroscience is to understand behaviour. Much of the behaviour we do understand occurs in the laboratory, in nonstressful conditions, using a computer monitor, a beep to signal the onset of an event, a button press and a formal task so that we can control all the variables. All good science. But most behaviour occurs in motion, in a behavioural stream that has ambiguous 'start' signals (sometimes internally generated), involves the whole body and language, has consequences and is performed under some form of short-term or long-term stress. Our assumption as scientists is that our lab-based tasks will hit something fundamental that has relevance in the real world. The real world, unlike the lab, is of course messy, a bad place to do science, but if we are to understand behaviour, we have to confront it.
A physicist is able to say that the desk on which my computer now rests is in a sense not solid (I know, wood is a solid), but the spacing of the atomic structure means that it is mostly empty space. This is true, beautiful and interesting, but of no use whatsoever to a carpenter. In cognitive neuroscience there is only carpentry: unlike my desk, people, in Skinner's words, emit behaviour and behavioural findings only mean something in the real world. Laboratory behaviour does not have the same status as atomic structure, and cognitive neuroscience, despite inflated claims of applications to education, cognitive neuroenhancement, decision making and psychiatry, has in many senses not delivered. We have not been able to build the bridges necessary between different levels of explanation, a thesis recently articulated by Gary Marcus [1] . We have to get out more, and in doing career prizes). This presents another highly unusual stress with which to cope.
The role of the brain in sports performance can also be seen in fatigue: muscle groups fail when there are still more than 50% of fibres available for recruitment. This has led to the hypothesis of a central governor controlling the 'decision' to fail [2] . This theory presents a challenge to ideas of emotion, responses to stress and the capacity of the brain to predict.
Taken together, this list of challenges the brain faces in producing a sporting performance, dealing with its consequences and the stresses of premature retirement present cognitive neuroscience with two opportunities. The first is to apply its findings to the improvement of elite sporting performance. The vital 1% enhancement in performance may well come from the organ that consumes up to 20% of the energy fed into the body. This challenge directly faces cognitive neuroscience with the question, how much of what we discover in the lab/scanner translates to consequential acts carried out under pressure? The second opportunity is to use the study of sports elites to inform us about normal behaviour, much as the study of neuropsychological patients has informed our knowledge of the intact brain. I think there is room here for meaningful advances in understanding and applications in skill learning, resilience, coping with defeat, decision making, prospective memory, reward, central control of the 'decision' to fail, planning, emotions, sleep and the notion of 10,000 hours of practice. Sport presents a harsh test bed for any claims of applicability of laboratory findings, but it may well be a proving ground for making psychological and cognitive neuroscience more directly practical in everyday life.
A good start has been made. Noakes' controversial model of the central control of fatigue [2] was inspired by Mosso's earlier predictions [3] . The idea is that fatigue is an experience Sport is a demanding activity requiring more cognitive skills than is often appreciated. By trying to understand the sporting brain, in particular that of elite athletes, we may learn something about behaviour relevant to the normal population. We may also be confronted by the limits of current cognitive neuroscience. Here I outline some of the key areas where engaging with the cognitive aspects of sport will help cognitive neuroscientists to confront the application of their science outside the laboratory.
Is sport the brain's biggest challenge?
generated, and indeed predicted by brain mechanisms protecting homeostasis, well before the limits of muscle are reached. Irrespective of one's opinion of it, this idea requires us to make a link between the brain and a behaviour that is usually seen as determined entirely peripherally. Perhaps we do not need a central control mechanism that can predict the effort required to run 26 miles at the start of a race, but the link between the brain and physical performance is real. A series of experiments from Marcora and colleagues has shown that mental effort prior to exercise increases the perception of effort and has a detrimental effect on subsequent endurance performance [4] [5] [6] . The implications of this work are potentially far reaching for sports practitioners: what kinds of mental activity are beneficial or detrimental to physical performance? Understanding the brain mechanisms of this will require cognitive neuroscience to develop methods and models that can assess brain activity in real time under conditions of stress and activity.
The areas of learning and delivery of skill under pressure present other challenges to cognitive neuroscience, and the implications may go well beyond sport. How much should we teach? How much should we allow learning through play? Is there such a thing as talent, making it pointless to punish children with lessons on things they will just never get? Sporting skills (golf, for example) are sometimes closed systems that lend themselves to lab testing, but some labs have made great strides in capturing open-ended skills that are harder to constrain in the lab. The work of Keith Davids has grappled with the problems of long-term learning in many sports from football to ice climbing. The approach taken is one of understanding the ecological dynamics of action and learning and applying constraints to facilitate learning [7, 8] . Davids' work offers cognitive neuroscientists another chance to grasp the uncomfortable nettle of affordances (those pesky things that don't so easily lend themselves to easy manipulation in the lab) and gives a framework, through sport, for thinking about complex learning of knowledge (which indeed is what a complex skill is). Affordances are the aspects of objects that signal possibilities for action: javelins for throwing; hurdles for jumping; balls for kicking etc. The active nature of sport, or other actions not related to sport (we push, press, throw, sit, catch etc. for other reasons) lays bare the shortcomings of perceptual science, skill learning and the science of decision-making.
Once learned, skills must be delivered under pressure and at a specific point in time. The Germans and Argentines playing in the World Cup final as I type (yes, I know, terrible planning), will not get a second chance. They have to deliver now, in front of millions of judging eyes. Like central fatigue and affordances, resilience is hard to pin down, but that is nature -the concepts at the core of complex behaviour may not prove to be as easy to manipulate as thresholds, attentional capacity, list length, button presses or any other of the myriad of favoured variables that we use as lab proxies of reality. The reality of behaviour might be messier than we would like. Insights into resilience in elite athletes has come from a number of studies that have measured the components of resilience in Olympic champions and elite team sport players [9, 10] . The answers are not simple, but they are ripe for investigation in neuroimaging studies. What makes the best the best? There is an opportunity here to treat these elite athletes as case studies from which we can make useful generalizations, much as we have for over a century with neuropsychological single patient case studies. By studying the abnormal (the elite) we may learn about the population. To embrace this view requires a change of perspective in experimental settings. In laboratory studies we use populations in order to make population statements. But the Olympic champion is an outlier and even trying to make population statements about a population of outliers is difficult. Perhaps we can ask 'what makes this person able to do what they do?' It takes us away from the traditional population statement, but it is just another route to think and learn.
A reason to embrace sport as a measure of our applicability is that sport measures outputruthlessly. In an age of neuro-law, neuro-marketing, neuro-decisionmaking, neuro-enhancement, neuro-whatever-one-can-get-awaywith, there will be no emerging field of neuro-sport for a very simple reason. Sport measures outcome with a finality of judgment that scientific papers would not pass. If we can deliver something from our work that passes tests of applicability in the sports domain, we will know that we have understood the link between neurons and complex behaviour. In return, sport is a test bed of nails that will demand thinking that may stretch traditional lab-based tasks in psychology and cognitive neuroscience to the breaking point. Game on?
